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On April 8, 2010, Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick announced that his state would soon receive more than 
$3.2 million in federal stimulus funding for a program that would train state residents for jobs in health care. “The 
health care industry is a large part of the economic engine in Massachusetts, and my administration is working 
overtime to ensure that our workforce has every chance to become competitive in this field,” Governor Patrick 
stated in a news release announcing the grant. Senator John Kerry added a statement to the release as well: “In this 
slumping economy when so many people are trying to find work, healthcare jobs are more desirable and marketable 
than ever. This substantial investment means thousands of workers can get the training and skills they need to find 
rewarding work.”1 Patrick’s press release—and the training program that it trumpeted—highlighted the centrality of 
health care as an economic sector in Massachusetts and around the United States. Nowhere was this more evident 
than in Boston, the state’s largest city, where hospitals constituted six of the ten largest private employers, and 
health care accounted for more than 17 percent of all jobs.2 Hospitals, and the health-care sector more generally, 
had clearly emerged as a key anchor institution for the postindustrial city of the early twenty-first century.
Just three days before Governor Patrick’s announcement, however, a different and far less optimistic dimension 
of the urban hospital’s economic role had played out two hundred miles to the south in New York City. On the 
evening of April 5, the trustees of St. Vincent’s Hospital had announced that the venerable but financially troubled 
hospital would close within weeks. St. Vincent’s had been in operation since 1849, and had treated survivors of 
disasters ranging from the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire to the Titanic to 9/11.3 More prosaically, it had provided regu-
lar free treatment for the poor and uninsured, had played a central role at the height of the AIDS crisis in the 
1980s and 1990s, and had pioneered a “midwife-friendly,” “minimally-invasive” approach to obstetrical services. 
St. Vincent also employed 3,500 people—all of whom would lose their jobs. The Village Voice penned an obituary 
for the hospital, quoting the head of the nurses union, who declared: “We are watching a murder here on Seventh 
Avenue.”4
The discordant quality of these two events, occurring within days of each other in Boston and New York, is only 
heightened by the observation that they took place barely two weeks after President Obama signed the explosively 
controversial Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010. The health-care reform bill, however, points to 
a deep connection between Governor Patrick’s health-care training initiative and the closing of St. Vincent’s. That 
critical link lies in the relationship between hospital growth, including employment, and the excessive costs of the 
wider U.S. health-care system. Hospitals specifically and the health-care sector in general have been one of the few 
consistent economic growth engines in U.S. cities through the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Typi-
cally, hospitals provide jobs at a wide range of skill and educational levels, often with better pay and more oppor-
tunities for advancement than other leading urban economic sectors.5 The sector, quite simply, has been far more 
successful at promoting long-term urban economic development than most of the strategies put forth by either 
national-level policymakers or locally-based community development organizations. This is the dynamic, expansive 
quality that led the Patrick administration to focus stimulus funds on training for health-care jobs. Yet this very 
success is deeply rooted in the wider dysfunction of the U.S. health-care system, and, in particular, in its inability to 
control costs while providing universal access for lower-income Americans. Hospital costs are one of the most im-
portant contributors to the excessive cost structures that plague the U.S. health-care system. Yet it is these very costs 
that have facilitated the sector’s expansive growth in U.S. cities. St. Vincent’s, and its 3,500 mostly urban employees, 




2	 	Boston	Redevelopment	Authority	(BRA),	The Boston Economy 2008: Holding Strong	(Boston:	BRA,	September	2008),	13;	BRA, The Largest Private 
Employers in Boston: 2001 (Boston:	BRA,	August	2001),	4.	
3	 	Sharon	Otterman,	“St.	Vincent’s	Votes	to	Shut	Hospital	in	Manhattan,”	New York Times,	6	April	2010.




care to people regardless of ability to pay while also depending on flows of revenue from third-party payers desper-
ate to cut hospital costs.6 As such, the connection between the Massachusetts training program, the closing of St. 
Vincent’s, and cost-control imperatives of health-care reform highlights a central dilemma for the U.S. health-care 
system, for urban policymakers, and for community development activists.
This paper seeks to explore this dilemma, its history, and, in particular, the contradictions, challenges, and oppor-
tunities that it poses for community development in U.S. cities. Are urban hospitals, as Governor Patrick’s training 
programs would suggest, a largely overlooked resource for urban economic development that can provide a ladder 
of long-term upward mobility for impoverished inner-city communities? Or, as St. Vincent’s would indicate, are 
urban hospitals an anchor that has been dropped into sand, and that may be swept away by the winds of the health-
care crisis that has begun to storm across the United States? 
The Hospital as Urban Economic Anchor
A brief statistical review provides a measure of the importance of hospitals as urban economic institutions, and 
especially as employers. According to a study conducted in the late 1990s by Ira Harkavy and Harmon Zuckerman, 
hospitals were six of the top-ten private employers in Washington, D.C., three of the top ten in Baltimore, and five 
of the top ten in Philadelphia. Hospitals and universities together accounted for 34.7 percent of jobs in the twenty 
largest U.S. cities, each of which had at least one university or hospital among its top-ten employers. Five of the cit-
ies had four to six of these institutions among their top ten.7 
More recent statistics derived from the 2002 and 2007 Economic Census demonstrate that the economic central-
ity of urban hospitals has continued into the new century. They also show that hospitals play a particularly critical 
role in high-poverty cities. Table 1 lists the ranking of the hospital sector as an employer in both 2002 and 2007 for 
the twenty-six cities with the highest individual poverty rates in 2007 (and population of at least 250,000).8 In 2002, 
hospitals were the top employer in six of the ten highest poverty cities, and in eight or nine of the top twenty-six 
poverty cities. Hospitals ranked second or third in three additional cities in the top ten, and as many as six more in 
the top twenty-six. The sector ranked among the top five employers in all but one of the cities—hospitals in Atlanta 
ranked between fourth and seventh, as data limitations prevented a more precise ranking. The data showed a weak 
regional pattern as well. All of the cities in which hospitals ranked first or second in employment were located in the 
Northeast or Midwest, while five of the eight cities in which hospitals ranked fourth or lower were in the South or 
West (although hospitals also ranked fourth in Chicago, Columbus, and Toledo).
Similar patterns appeared in the 2007 data, with a slight decline in the relative importance of hospitals as urban em-
ployers. For 2007, hospitals were the top employer in five of the top ten highest poverty cities and eight of the top 
twenty-six. The sector ranked second or third for 2007 in three additional top ten cities and five in the top twenty-
six. Once again, the sector ranked in the top five in twenty-five of the cities, with Atlanta again ranging between 
fourth and seventh. The limited regional differences also persisted, as all nine of the cities in which hospitals were 
the first or second largest employers were in the East or Midwest. Six of the eleven cities in which hospital employ-
ment ranked fourth or lower were located in the Sunbelt. 
These rankings actually understate the centrality of hospital-related employment, as all of the cities also had sub-
stantial numbers of jobs in the category of ambulatory health-care services. Although this category includes employ-
ment in doctors’ and dentists’ offices, it also accounts for outpatient clinics and surgery centers, many of which 
have close connections to hospitals.9 Overall, the health-care sector was the top employer in twenty-two of the 
twenty-six cities in 2002 and in twenty-one of the twenty six-cities in 2007.10 










These data reflect a core reality of the U.S. economy as the second decade of the twenty-first century begins. Health 
care accounts for approximately 17 percent of U.S. GDP, and the nation’s cities are the central locus of this indus-
try. This reality must be taken into account in developing urban policy and community development strategies, 
particularly in relation to employment and workforce training. A key step toward doing so lies in understanding the 
history of the urban hospital sector and its relationship with the wider health-care system.
Urban Policy and the Health-Care Economy
Ultimately, the previous section illuminates a broader trend: as manufacturing has declined in the United States, 
hospitals have increasingly replaced factories at the core of the urban economy. Such numbers alone, though, tend 
to obscure another dimension of this change: public policies enabled the physical expansion of urban health-care 
institutions, and then played a crucial part in financing their health-care and research activities through both direct 
spending and tax expenditures. The remainder of this paper evaluates the history of these policy interactions and of-
fers a preliminary assessment of their implications for community development strategies in inner-city communities. 
It starts from a simple premise: that in recent decades, health-care policy has also been urban policy.11
Four federal programs contributed to the expansion and modernization of urban hospitals during the post–World 
War II period, three of them directly and one indirectly. The direct policies included the Hill-Burton loan and grant 
program, the urban-renewal program, and the Federal Housing Administration’s hospital mortgage insurance pro-
gram. The indirect policy area consisted of the Medicare and Medicaid programs, which reshaped hospitals’ financ-
ing and operational functions after 1965. Of these programs, only urban renewal was explicitly conceived of as an 
urban policy. Yet all four created intersections between urban hospitals’ roles as providers of medical care—especially 
for the urban poor—and their increasing importance as anchor institutions in postindustrial cities. It is these inter-
sections that blur distinctions between policy areas to the point where it can be concluded that in the United States, 
health-care policy has operated as a critical but largely unrecognized form of urban policy.
Hill-Burton is the most widely recognized but, for large cities at least, the least important of these federal programs. 
Passed in 1946 as the Hospital Survey and Construction Act, the Hill-Burton program was the only part of Harry 
Truman’s 1945 national health-care proposal that actually became law.12 The program primarily offered federal 
matching grants for the construction of new hospitals and nursing homes. From 1947 to 1971, it allocated $3.7 
billion for hospital construction, which helped support approximately 30 percent of all such projects in the United 
States. As a result of the program’s 2:1 state-local matching requirement, this covered about 10 percent of total 
hospital construction costs during the period. Initially, however, Hill-Burton focused resources on areas that lacked 
hospital facilities and did not make grants to regions with an average of more than 4.5 hospital beds for every one 
thousand residents. Many larger cities, which already had existing hospitals, exceeded this cap. This meant that the 
bulk of Hill-Burton money went to small communities and rural areas rather than cities. Cities with populations 
greater than 250,000 received only about 13.3 percent of Hill-Burton funds, despite having 22 percent of the total 
population in the 1960 census. This disparity declined slightly after a 1964 amendment permitted the program to 
make grants for the modernization of existing, outmoded hospitals regardless of the per capita bed ceiling. Al-
though such facilities were common in central cities, the urban-rural gap remained. As late as 1968–70, larger cities 
still received only 18.1 percent of Hill-Burton funds.13 Nonetheless, Hill-Burton was not unimportant for large 
cities: even with the funding disparity, 34.5 percent of the total inpatient beds the program eventually funded were 
located in central cities.14
11	 	Although	social	scientists	have	identified	the	centrality	of	“eds	and	meds”	in	contemporary	cities,	the	subject	has	received	almost	no	research	attention	
from	historians.	Existing	scholarship	on	the	history	of	hospitals	approaches	the	subject	from	a	history	of	medicine	perspective.	See,	for	example,	Rose-
mary	Stevens, In Sickness and in Wealth: American Hospitals in the Twentieth Century	(Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1999).	For	a	limited	
exception,	see	Sandra	Opdycke, No One Was Turned Away: The Role of Public Hospitals in New York City Since 1900	(New	York:	Oxford	University	
Press,	1999).
12	 	Paul	Starr,	The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry	(New	York:	Basic	
Books,	1982),	283,	347–51.
13	 	The	program’s	matching	requirement	also	meant	that	it	disproportionately	benefitted	moderate-income	communities,	as	poorer	areas	proved	less	able	to	
provide	the	required	local	contribution.	Judith	R.	Lave	and	Lester	B.	Lave,	The Hospital Construction Act: An Evaluation of the Hill-Burton Program, 
1948–1973 (Washington,	D.C.:	The	American	Enterprise	Institute	for	Public	Policy	Research,	1974),	8–9,16–21;	U.S.	Department	of	Health,	Educa-
tion,	and	Welfare,	Public	Health	Service,	Hill-Burton Program: Progress Report July 1, 1947–June 30, 1961	(Washington,	D.C.:	Public	Health	Service,	
1961),	32–33;	U.S.	Department	of	Health,	Education,	and	Welfare,	Public	Health	Service,	Hill-Burton Program: Progress Report July 1, 1947–June 30, 
1961	(Washington,	D.C.:	GPO,	1968),	27–35;	Stevens,	In Sickness and In Wealth,	216–24,	294–96;	Joseph	Mantone,	“The	Big	Bang,”	Modern Health 
Care,	15	August	2005,	6–16.
14	 	U.S.	Congress,	Senate,	Subcommittee	on	Health	of	the	Committee	on	Labor	and	Public	Welfare,	Hill-Burton Hospital Survey and Construction Act: 
History of the Program and Current Problems and Issues,	93rd	Cong.,	2nd	sess.,	June	1973,	Committee	Print,	11,	13.6
Although smaller than Hill-Burton in its overall contribution to hospital growth in the United States, urban re-
newal would prove more important for the urban hospital sector. Scholars have long recognized that urban renewal 
redefined American cities during the postwar period, usually for the worse. Most studies have focused on how urban 
renewal destroyed intact, often minority neighborhoods, displaced residents, exacerbated segregation, and facilitated 
the expansion of high-end service industries even as manufacturing declined in the cities’ central cores. Urban insti-
tutions such as universities and hospitals have frequently been identified as among the leading contributors to such 
negative consequences.15 The basic fact of such institutions’ participation in urban renewal reflected tensions over 
core purposes that had been built into the program from its inception. The Housing Act of 1949, which provided 
the legislative basis for the program, explicitly stated that its purpose was to provide “a decent home and a suitable 
living environment for every American family.” In order to gain the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the ur-
ban business and real estate interests who were well represented in Congress, advocates of low-income housing had 
to tie this goal to the related but not identical objective of clearing “blighted” areas from the urban core. As a result, 
urban renewal offered local governments a “write-down” subsidy that covered two-thirds of the costs of assembling 
and clearing blighted land that could then be made available for redevelopment. The legislation also required that 
projects merely be “predominantly residential.” This language opened the possibility of including commercial and 
institutional developments along with housing as part of urban-renewal projects.16
Amendments to the legislation in 1954 further loosened the constraints on nonresidential components of urban re-
newal. By the late 1950s, universities and hospitals around the United States began to take advantage of the federal 
write-down to undertake expansions of urban campuses and medical facilities.17 After 1959, however, linking institu-
tional expansion to urban renewal became far simpler. Under Section 112 of the 1959 amendments to the housing 
act, Congress made universities eligible for urban-renewal funds with no requirement that such projects be linked 
to housing. Two years later, hospitals received the same privilege at the request of the American Hospital Associa-
tion. As the University of Chicago’s Julian Levi, an early leader in urban campus expansion, explained to the House 
Subcommittee on Housing, universities could not “live with the 51-percent residential requirement . . . because 
what we need are campus facilities . . . . You can’t because the moment you try to use the urban renewal tool, you 
are confronted with the fact that your project isn’t eligible and the only way you can make it eligible is to put hous-
ing back; and if you put housing back, you defeat the whole purpose of the operation.”18 Levi’s comment about “the 
whole purpose of the operation” reflects the institutions’ effort to shift the core purpose of urban renewal further 
away from its original, if nominal, housing purpose and toward an explicit emphasis on rebuilding cities through 
institutional expansion.
Section 112 had one other important feature. It allowed cities to claim any expenditures made by universities or 
hospitals for urban renewal as “grants-in-aid” that counted toward the required local contribution to the 2:1 federal-
local matching grant ratio. If those grants-in-aid exceeded the necessary local expenditure, the federal government 
would provide credits of equal value towards ongoing or future urban-renewal projects in the city.19 This did two 
things. First, it created an incentive for cities to expand their institutional urban-renewal programs in order to reduce 
immediate local costs (as the institutions would make the expenditures) while also generating subsidies for the city’s 
overall urban-renewal program. By 1961, officials with the Urban Renewal Administration even became concerned 
that some local redevelopment authorities had come to view Section 112 as a way “to undertake these projects 
15	 	Arnold	R.	Hirsch,	Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940–1960	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1983);	John	F.	Bau-
man,	Public Housing, Race, and Renewal: Urban Planning in Philadelphia, 1920–1974 (Philadelphia:	Temple	University	Press,	1987);	Jon	C.	Teaford,	
The Rough Road to Renaissance: Urban Revitalization in America, 1940–1985	(Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1990);	Joel	Schwartz,	The 
New York Approach: Robert Moses, Urban Liberals, and the Redevelopment of the Inner City	(Columbus:	Ohio	State	University	Press,	1993);	June	Man-
ning	Thomas,	Redevelopment and Race: Planning a Finer City in Postwar Detroit	(Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1997).
16	 	The	legislation	defined	“predominantly	residential”	to	mean	that	50	percent	of	the	buildings	either	cleared	or	built	in	a	project	had	to	be	residential.	Roger	












without local contribution.”20 Second, it erased whatever weak distinction still remained between public and private 
in urban renewal and, more broadly, in the economics of urban land. Private institutional purposes, under this 
conception, were presumed to be inseparable from the public good. Despite their broad implications, these changes 
generated little controversy, and Congress passed the Section 112 amendment without debate.21 
Congress may not have noticed what it was doing, but urban political and institutional leaders certainly did. By 
1964, the Housing and Home Finance Agency reported that 154 urban-renewal projects around the United States, 
involving 120 colleges and universities and 75 hospitals, had already taken advantage of Section 112’s institutional 
provisions.22 This included both major urban medical centers such as the Detroit Medical Center and Johns Hop-
kins University Hospital in Baltimore as well as such smaller institutions as Druid City Hospital in Tuscaloosa and 
Mercy Hospital in Des Moines.23 Neither HHFA nor later the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
compiled detailed information about such projects, but a 1964 study of Boston by Julian Levi demonstrated that 
the existing plans of colleges, universities, and hospitals in that city alone could generate almost $31.7 million in 
Section 112 credits.24 
Both Hill-Burton and urban renewal involved various forms of direct federal expenditures to subsidize construc-
tion. By the late 1960s, however, hospitals began to finance a greater percentage of construction costs through debt 
rather than by raising capital.25 This led to two significant shifts in federal policy, which in turn served to reinforce 
the trend. First, Congress added a Hill-Burton loan program in 1970—previously Hill-Burton had provided only 
grants—and then transitioned the entire Hill-Burton operation to loans four years later. Second, the federal govern-
ment began to guarantee hospital mortgages. The post–World War II role of the Federal Housing Administration’s 
(FHA) home mortgage insurance program in promoting suburbanization is well known.26 Yet few scholars recognize 
that, beginning in 1969, the FHA also provided mortgage insurance for hospitals. Just as in housing, the availabil-
ity of federal insurance reduces the risk to a lender in the event that a hospital defaults on its loan. This lower risk 
means that the lender can offer the loan at a lower interest rate, which significantly reduces the cost of credit to the 
borrower and, in turn, the overall costs of a project.
Authorized by Section 242 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, this program remains in opera-
tion today (in slightly modified form). As of January 2010, it had guaranteed $15.7 billion of hospital mortgages. In 
contrast to Hill-Burton, Section 242 has been a heavily urban program. Approximately $7.48 billion of the guaran-
tees have gone to cities that ranked among the fifty largest in the United States in the previous decennial census. 
Many additional guarantees have gone to smaller but still distinctly urban places, as well as the suburbs of major 
cities. Until recently, it has also been heavily oriented toward the Northeast and Midwest. New York City alone 
has secured more than a third of the total guarantees, or $5.7 billion, far more than any other city. If a number of 
very large loan guarantees undertaken since 2005 are excluded, the remaining cities in the top-ten recipients include 
Buffalo, Boston, Jersey City, Philadelphia, Patterson, Detroit, Chicago, and Atlantic City, with only Miami, in sixth 
position, located in the Sunbelt.27 Although the program has guaranteed only a relatively small portion of overall 
hospital construction during this period—about 4.5 percent of total private hospital construction—its role in these 
urban areas has been far more significant.28
20	 	Frederick	O’R.	Hayes	to	William	L.	Slayton,	11	December	1961,	National	Archives	II,	HUD	General	Records,	URA,	Subject	Files	1961–65,	Box	720,	
Folder:	“College	&	University	Projects	1961	(Section	112).”
21	 	Testimony	of	Karl	Klicka,	Congress,	Senate,	Committee	on	Banking	and	Currency,	Housing Legislation of 1961,	87th	Cong.,	1st	sess.,	11	April	1961,	
724–29.	Senator	Prescott	Bush	of	Connecticut	did	attempt	to	remove	the	amendment	in	1959.	Julian	H.	Levi,	Municipal and Institutional Relations 
Within Boston: The Benefits of Section 112 of the Federal Housing Act of 1961	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1964), Appendix	L,	131–36.
22	 	Housing	and	Home	Finance	Agency,	18th Annual Report 1964 (Washington,	D.C.:	GPO,	1965),	326.
23	 	Testimony	of	Julian	Levi,	Congress,	House,	Subcommittee	of	Housing	of	the	Committee	on	Banking	and	Currency,	Housing Act of 1959,	88th	Cong.,	
1st	sess.,	19	November	1963,	258–59.
24	 	Levi,	Municipal and Institutional Relations Within Boston, 3.	For	background	on	Levi’s	study,	see	Sylvan	Kamm	to	Frederick	O’R.	Hayes,	7	Septem-
ber	1961,	and	Frederick	O’R.	Hayes	to	William	L.	Slayton,	23	October	1961,	both	in	National	Archives	II,	HUD	General	Records,	URA,	Subject	Files	
1961–65,	Box	720,	Folder:	“College	&	University	Projects	1961	(Section	112).”
25	 	Stevens,	In Sickness and In Wealth,	294–95.








The Urban Hospital in the Community
These outlines of key federal hospital-aid programs simply sketch the bare bones of public policy in this area. They 
capture little of how these programs actually worked in cities, and of what the “on-the-ground” impact of hospital 
expansion has actually been in urban communities. The best means to assess such wider relationships is through a 
brief case study of the experience of a major urban medical center—the Tufts–New England Medical Center, lo-
cated in Boston’s South Cove neighborhood. Since the 1950s, Tufts–New England Medical Center has interacted 
with each of the major federal policies that have facilitated the expansion of urban hospitals. It has also frequently 
come into conflict with residents of the surrounding South Cove community of Chinatown. As such, it provides a 
potential archetype for how federal policies have facilitated urban hospital expansion and also suggests some of the 
possibilities—and the challenges—inherent in connecting urban hospital growth to community development.
By the mid-twentieth century, Tufts–New England Medical Center operated as a loose consortium of hospitals 
working in cooperation with Tufts University Medical and Dental Schools. The center occupied a group of aging 
and poorly coordinated facilities in the South Cove, surrounded by a neighborhood that included a commercial 
and theater district as well as the three- and four-story residential flats of an area that since the 1930s had become 
identified as the core of Boston’s Chinatown. Many of the residential buildings had begun to experience significant 
deterioration, and in some parts of the neighborhood landlords had demolished significant numbers of older build-
ings to create income-generating parking lots. Highway construction along the South Cove’s southern and eastern 
edge had already displaced thousands of residents and caused significant disruption to the Chinatown community. 
Determined to improve both its facilities and its surroundings, Medical Center leadership undertook a major inter-
nal planning initiative during the early 1960s.29
Like most urban hospitals, the Medical Center received only limited support from the Hill-Burton program, consist-
ing solely of a 1953 grant of $81,816 for the remodeling of “adjunct service facilities.”30 The center’s engagement 
with the urban-renewal program, however, provided the initial mechanism for expansion into a full-scale modern 
medical center. The availability of Section 112 credits allowed the Medical Center to link its own urban-planning 
process—conducted by an internal Medical Center planning office—to the citywide urban-renewal process pushed 
forward during the 1960s by Boston Mayor John Collins and urban-renewal director Edward Logue. Through 
Section 112, the growth of the Medical Center generated more than $5 million in credits that Logue and Collins 
could apply to their expensive downtown plans. 31 A nascent, citywide rebellion against urban renewal, however, left 
Boston’s City Council hesitant to endorse the arrangement. To placate the council, the Medical Center agreed to set 
aside land for residential redevelopment by Chinese American community groups. Over the following decades, in-
termittent conflict with the community continued over the displacement of residents by the construction of parking 
garages and other hospital-related facilities. Under heavy pressure from the community, the Medical Center even-
tually cooperated in a series of projects that included the construction of affordable housing and the creation of a 
community health center.32 Still, by 1975, urban renewal had allowed the Medical Center to complete the construc-
tion of its new Proger Hospital facility, which housed the center’s main inpatient services, as well as a new building 
for the Tufts University Dental School. This construction followed the basic outlines of the urban-renewal plan that 
the Medical Center and the Boston Redevelopment Authority had finalized in 1965. Urban renewal, in short, had 
29	 	Kevin	Lynch,	Medical Center in the South Cove: A Study for the Development of the New England Medical Center and Its Neighborhood; submitted 
to the Executive Board, New England Medical Center,	December	1955,	Boston	Public	Library	Government	Documents,	Internet	Archive,	http://www.
archive.org/details/bostonpubliclibrary,	1–16,	20–24,	32–37,	80;	Hermann	H.	Field,	Development of the Tufts–New England Medical Center: A Prelimi-
nary Study	(Boston:	Tufts–New	England	Medical	Center,	October	1964),	1–2,	11–15;	Hermann	H.	Field,	“Application	of	Comprehensive	Planning	to	the	
Urban	Teaching	Medical	Center,”	Hospitals	39	(1	November	1965).
30	 	U.S.	Department	of	Health,	Education,	and	Welfare,	Public	Health	Service,	Hill-Burton Project Register July 1, 1947–June 30, 1968	(Washington,	D.C.:	
GPO,	1968),	101.
31	 	Levi,	Municipal and Institutional Relations Within Boston,	7–14;	Charles	J.	Horan	to	Edward	J.	Logue,	n.d.,	and	“Tufts–New	England	Medical	Center	
Certificate	of	Resolution,”	5	November	1962,	both	reprinted	in	ibid.,	116–17;	Field,	Development of the Tufts–New England Medical Center,	2–9;	John	
Morris	Dixon,	“New	Dimension	in	Urban	Renewal,”	Architectural Forum	129	(September	1968):	44.
32	 	Tufts–New	England	Medical	Center,	The Economic Impact of the Tufts–New England Medical Center on the City of Boston and the Surrounding 
Metropolitan Area	(Boston:	Tufts–New	England	Medical	Center,	[1974]),	95–100;	Field,	Development of the Tufts–New England Medical Center,	9–10;	
Dixon,	“New	Dimension	in	Urban	Renewal,”	44;	BRA,	Chinatown–South Cove: District Profile and Proposed 1979–1981 Neighborhood Improvement 
Program	(Boston:	BRA,	1979);	Chinatown–South	Cove	Neighborhood	Council,	“Chinatown	Community	Plan:	A	Plan	to	Manage	Growth,”	March	1990,	
Boston	Public	Library	Government	Documents,	Internet	Archive,	http://www.archive.org/details/bostonpubliclibrary,	23,	26–27;	Bill Kovach,	“Grow-
ing	Universities	Fight	Cities	for	Room,”	New York Times,	30	August	1970;	Thomas	H.	O’Connor,	Building a New Boston: Politics and Urban Renewal, 
1950–1970	(Boston:	Northeastern	University	Press,	1993),	210–48.9
solidified the position of the Tufts–New England Medical Center as a major part of Boston’s emerging health-care 
economy.33
Expansion continued during the late 1970s and 1980s, as the Medical Center built a new facility for the Boston 
Floating Hospital, its primary provider of pediatric services. High debt levels from the Proger and Dental School 
projects, however, forced the Medical Center to turn to the FHA’s Section 242 mortgage insurance program to 
help finance its continued growth during this period. In doing so, the Medical Center followed a pattern typical of 
hospitals in the urban Northeast during the period.34 One estimate indicated that FHA insurance would lead savings 
of as much as $10 million in debt service because of reduced interest rates for the Floating Hospital project.35 The 
new Floating Hospital building opened in 1982, followed soon thereafter by the renovation of the Medical Center’s 
ambulatory-care facilities and the construction of a Magnetic Resonance Imaging Center. These projects completed 
the modernization process that hospital administrators and planners had envisioned more than a quarter of a cen-
tury earlier.36
This growth had significant economic implications. As early as 1972–73, studies of the Medical Center’s economic 
impact found that it had major effects in expenditures, employment, and construction.37 By 1997, the center had 
4,995 employees and had become the city’s seventh largest private employer. Since the late 1970s, it has made an 
annual “payment in lieu of taxes” to the city, which is now more than $1 million; yet without the exemption, the 
center would pay $15.8 million in annual property taxes.38 More broadly, health services accounted for 14.5 per-
cent of all jobs in Boston by the late 1990s, and 17 percent by 2007.39 The health-care anchor that Governor Patrick 
would highlight in 2010 had been established. 
Some of the benefits of this growth have been captured for community development purposes. Beginning in 1983, 
the Medical Center reached an agreement with the Chinatown community under which it would provide “$100,000 
to fund a contract allowing the CCBA [a Chinatown community organization] to conduct a job training program 
and educational program to train persons for hospital related jobs” in exchange for the community’s support of 
previously controversial elements of the center’s development program.40 The agreement has continued to the 
present. More recently, a two-decade-long struggle against a Medical Center plan to build an 850-car parking garage 
concluded with the construction instead of the Metropolitan—a 23-story, mixed-income development that reserved 
46 percent of its units for affordable housing and included space for four community agencies that offer child-care 
services, youth programs, job training, and ESL services.41 Such examples suggest that under certain circumstances, 
inner-city communities can successfully exert the political pressure necessary to capture at least some of the eco-
nomic benefits of urban health-care growth. 
33	 	BRA,	Urban Renewal Plan: South Cove Urban Renewal Area; Project No. Mass. R-92,	8	June	1965; Coopers	&	Lybrand,	“New	England	Medical	Cen-
ter	Hospital:	Report	on	Financial	Feasibility	Study	of	Proposed	Construction	Program,”	16	January	1979,	National Archives II, HRSA Records, Division 
of Facilities Financing, Loan	Project	Files	for	Hill-Burton	Loan	Program	and	Section	242	Mortgage	Insurance	Program,	1969–80,	Box	11,	Folder:	“New	
England	Medical	Center	Boston,	Mass.,	250024,”	13;	Tufts	Medical	Center,	Institutional Master Plan 2010–2020	Submitted	to	BRA,	7	April	2010,	
2:3–9.	For	the	original	plan,	see	BRA,	Urban	Renewal	Plan:	South	Cove	Urban	Renewal	Area;	Project	No.	Mass.	R-92,	8	June	1965,	Boston	Public	
Library	Government	Documents,	Internet	Archive,	http://www.archive.org/details/bostonpubliclibrary.
34	 	Ellen	Connolly	to	William	R.	Wilson,	24	August	1979,	National	Archives	II,	Records of the Health Resources and Services Administration, Bureau of 
Health Maintenance Organizations, Office of Health Facilities [hereafter, HRSA Records], Division of Facilities Financing, Loan	Project	Files	for	Hill-
Burton	Loan	Program	and	Section	242	Mortgage	Insurance	Program,	1969–80,	Box	11,	Folder:	“New	England	Medical	Center	Boston,	Mass.,	250024.”
35	 	“Enclosure,”	undated,	attached	to	Joanne	Baxter	Bluestone	to	Franklin	Parker,	22	November	1978,	National Archives II, HRSA Records, Division of 
Facilities Financing, Loan	Project	Files	for	Hill-Burton	Loan	Program	and	Section	242	Mortgage	Insurance	Program,	1969–80,	Box	11,	Folder:	“New	
England	Medical	Center	Boston,	Mass.,	250024,”	4.
36	 	Tufts	Medical	Center,	Institutional Master Plan, 2010–2020,	2:7.
37	 	Tufts–New	England	Medical	Center,	The Economic Impact of the Tufts–New England Medical Center, 1–10.
38	 	BRA,	History of Boston’s Economy: Growth and Transition, 1970–1998 (Boston:	BRA,	November	1999),	22–23.	Boston’s	PILOT	(Payment	In	Lieu	
Of	Taxes)	program	began	during	the	administration	of	Mayor	Kevin	White	in	the	1970s,	but	the	idea	had	been	considered	by	Edward	Logue	as	early	as	
1961.	Eric	A.	Lustig,	“The	Boston	City	PILOT	Task	Force:	An	Emerging	Best	Practice,”	New England Law Review	44	(Spring	2010):	601–19;	BRA,	
Back Bay–Beacon Hill–Bay Village: District Profile and Proposed 1979–1981 Neighborhood Improvement Program	(Boston:	BRA,	1979),	17;	Hayes	to	
Slayton,	23	October	1961.





Conclusion: The Health-Care Crisis and Community Development
A final irony must be noted in evaluating the role of public policy in the development of the urban health-care 
anchor: at the time that the Tufts–New England Medical Center expansion projects were planned, none was explic-
itly thought of as economic development measures. Instead, all the projects were considered solely in the context 
of health care. The role of the hospital as an employer could even come into conflict with the growing imperative 
toward hospital-cost containment. At one point in the Section 242 process, a federal official directly questioned the 
Medical Center’s high levels of employment relative to “the average for New England teaching hospitals” and won-
dered “why [full-time employees] would be projected to increase when a major objective of the building program 
is to increase efficiency.” “An explanation,” he concluded, “is necessary.”42 In a project concerned with economic 
development, no such explanation would have been required. 
At times, the consequences of structural economic change intersected directly with the imperatives of health-care 
policy, reflecting the underlying pressures that would eventually pair Governor Patrick’s health-care-training an-
nouncement with the closing of St. Vincent’s Hospital in Manhattan. In the late 1970s, the Social Security Adminis-
tration lowered the income classification of the Boston metropolitan area based on the region’s declining per capita 
income. This action led to steep cuts in regional Medicare and Medicaid hospital reimbursement rates. Declining 
per capita income, of course, reflected the broader economic transformation under way in cities like Boston. One 
federal analyst even recognized this, assuring the director of the Medicare Bureau that “it can be reasonably as-
sumed that the lower per capita income is an accurate reflection of the economic condition in that area. In Boston’s 
case, it appears that the lower per capita income group is a realistic reflection of that city’s relative standing in the 
country.”43 From the perspective of health-care cost control, this justified cutting rates, even if the policy hurt new 
urban anchors like hospitals—the very institutions that held the most direct promise for reversing the decline in per 
capita income. That, however, was not the SSA’s concern.
Although the New England Medical Center had the resources to sustain itself through such uncertainty, a number 
of smaller institutions in Boston found their very existence threatened.44 In such cases, just as at St. Vincent’s thirty 
years later, the role of health-care policy as a form of implicit urban policy proved deeply problematic. Along with 
inadequate access to health care and insurance coverage, the chief underlying problem of the U.S. health-care sys-
tem has been its inability to control costs. Yet it has been those excess expenditures that have funded the growth of 
the new urban health-care anchor, the economic sector that has provided the chief replacement for manufacturing 
at the core of urban economies.
The story of Tufts–New England Medical Center’s growth embodies one promising aspect of the urban health-care 
sector that now stands at the core of the political economy of the postindustrial city. Although the modernization 
of the Medical Center caused significant residential displacement, it also made possible new community initiatives 
in affordable housing, health-care access, and especially job training. This outcome is the result of community de-
velopment strategies as well as of explicit and implicit public policies. Yet the case of St. Vincent’s Hospital, and the 
unsustainable cost pressures embedded in these same public policies, suggests a much more problematic relation-
ship between long-term community development and the urban hospital anchor. Hospitals, it is clear, can generate 
very real benefits for community development. Their emergence as a major employer and service provider and their 
potential responsiveness to community pressure, as the Tufts case shows, have been largely overlooked by com-
munity development strategists. Meanwhile, however, their very success in the role of an urban economic anchor is 
based on, and even contributes to, the systemic cost problems of the U.S. health-care sector as a whole. While more 
attention must be given to the role of hospitals in inner cities and as potential partners in community development, 
their long-term stability in their present role must not be assumed.
42	 	Paul	C.	O’Shea	to	Edward	Reynolds	Jr.,	22	August	1979,	National Archives II, HRSA Records, Division of Facilities Financing, Loan	Project	Files	
for	Hill-Burton	Loan	Program	and	Section	242	Mortgage	Insurance	Program,	1969–80,	Box	11,	Folder:	“New	England	Medical	Center	Boston,	Mass.,	
250024.”



















1 Detroit 808,327 33.8 1 1
2 Cleveland 395,310 29.5 1 1
3 Buffalo 264,292 28.7 1 1b
4 El Paso 605,410 27.4 4 4-7c
5 Memphis 637,425 26.2 3 3
6 Miami 348,827 25.5 2 3
7 Milwaukee 582,207 24.4 1a 4
8 Newark 270,007 23.9 2 3
9 Philadelphia 1,449,634 23.8 1 1
10 Cincinnati 297,304 23.5 1 1
11 Toledo 283,851 22.6 4 1
12 St. Louis 350,759 22.4 2-4 3
13 Fresno 476,460 21.9 4 5
14 Atlanta 432,511 21.1 4-7 4-6
15 Dallas 1,240,044 21.1 4 4
16 Pittsburgh 290,918 21.0 1 1
17 Columbus 732,974 21.0 4 4
18 Houston 2,046,792 20.7 4 4
19 Chicago 2,737,996 20.5 4 4
20 Minneapolis 351,184 20.4 2 4
21 Boston 613,117 20.4 1 1
22 Baltimore 637,455 20.0 1 2
23 Tulsa 389,536 19.1 2-5d 2-5d
24 St. Paul 266,258 18.9 1-3 1-4
25 Corpus Christi 290,010 18.8 2-5 4-5
26 New York City 8,274,527 18.5 3 5
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2002 and 2007 Economic Census, compiled from data reports generated using American 
FactFinder, http://factfinder.census.gov.
a   Food services employment (NAICS 722) ranged from 27 more than hospitals to 1,421 less.
b   Exact figure is not supplied; rank is based on minimum of range for the letter codes of NAICS 622 subcategories. 
c   Exact figure is not supplied; possible range of ranking calculated from minimum and maximum of letter-code ranges.
d   6-digit NAICS code provides range only.About the Author
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